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TORTS-INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS-
PHYSICAL INJURY OR INDEPENDENT TORT Is No LONGER RE-
QUIRED. M..M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681
(1980).
Shirley Ann Counce was employed as a cashier at M.B.M.
Company's place of business, Coleman's Bar-B-Q, in West Mem-
phis, Arkansas. She worked the night shift on February 1, 1977.
The following morning, it was discovered that approximately
ninety-nine dollars in checks and money were missing from the cash
register. The manager of the store called Counce at her home and
asked her about the incident. Counce explained that she had no
knowledge of the missing money and that she had followed routine
procedure at the end of her shift by placing all checks and money in
a sack and then depositing the sack in a vault.' Later, the manager
called Counce again and told her that she had been laid off because
the company had too much counter help.2 Counce asked when she
could pick up her check and was told that she would be required to
submit to a polygraph test before the company would release it.
Counce took a polygraph test and passed. The following day
she received a check in the amount of eighty-one cents for her last
seventeen hours of work. Jerrell Moss, the company's area
superviser, explained that thirty-three dollars was deducted from
her check because of the money that was missing from the cash
register.3
Counce was unable to find additional work and filed a claim
for unemployment benefits. She was told that she was disqualified
from receiving benefits because the Coleman Bar-B-Q report indi-
cated that she had been fired because of numerous customer com-
1. During the course of the plaintiff's deposition, she explained that the routine proce-
dure was to take all of the money out of the cash register, place it in a sack, and then deposit
it in a vault built into the floor. A money count was taken and a report was filled out, but no
total was computed on the report. Record at 88-89.
2. Jerrell Moss, the area supervisor for M.B.M. Company, explained in his deposition
that plaintiff was fired because of customer complaints and the disappearance of money on
her shift. Record at 42. However, the plaintiff stated that her manager, Jan Hylander, ex-
plained that she was fired because the company had too much counter help. Record at 86.
3. Mr. Moss explained that the deduction was the result of the cash shortage which
happened on the night shift when the plaintiff was working. He stated that two other girls
also had a $33 deduction from their checks because of the cash loss. Record at 46-47.
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plaints, her bad attitude, and violation of company policies.4
Counce sued M.B.M. Company alleging that its actions were
intended to cause her severe emotional distress. The trial court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Arkan-
sas Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a material issue of fact
was in dispute as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to damages
caused by the intentional infliction of emotional distress.5 The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court affirmed the appellate decision, recognizing
for the first time the intentional infliction of emotional distress as a
distinct and independent tort. MB.M Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269,
596 S.W.2d 681 (1980).6
The courts in both England and America have shown reluc-
tance to recognize the interest in peace of mind as a legally pro-
tected right.' In Lynch v. Knight' Lord Wensleydale succinctly
expressed the attitude of the nineteenth century English courts:
"Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend
to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that
alone. . . ."' Hence, in the case of Victorian Railways Commission-
ers v. Coultas,"° the Privy Council held that plaintiff could not re-
cover damages for nervous shock suffered when the defendant's
4. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1106(b) (1976) provides:
For all claims filed on and after July 1, 1973, if so found by the Director, an individual
shall be disqualified for benefits:
(1) If he is discharged from his last work for misconduct in connection with
the work. Such disqualification shall be for eight [8] weeks of unemploy-
ment as defined in subsection (i) of this section, except that
(2) If he is discharged from his last work for misconduct in connection with
the work on account of dishonesty, drinking on the job, reporting for
work while under the influence of intoxicants, or wilful violation of the
rules or customs of the employer pertaining to the safety of fellow em-
ployees or company property, he shall be disqualified from the date of
filing his claim until he shall have ten [101 weeks of employment in each
of which he shall have earned wages equal to at least his weekly benefit
amount.
5. Counce v. M.B.M. Co., 266 Ark. 1064, 597 S.W.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1979). The court of
appeals held that there was a material issue of fact whether the plaintiff suffered emotional
distress because of wrongful discharge by the defendant. 1d. at 1069, 597 S.W.2d at 95.
6. The Arkansas Supreme Court also held that the plaintiff had no cause of action for
breach of contract when, as here, the contract of employment was terminable at will and
when there was no indication of any violation of a clearly established public policy. M.B.M.
Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 280, 596 S.W.2d 681, 688 (1980).
7. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 12, at 49-50 (4th ed. 1971).
8. 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861).
9. Id. at 863. See also Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the Law of
Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936).
10. 13 A.C. 222 (1888).
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train nearly ran into the buggy in which the plaintiff was a passen-
ger. The Council stated that damages arising from mere sudden ter-
ror, unaccompanied by physical injury, were not allowable in an
action based on negligence. I
Later cases in England expressed dissatisfaction with the Coul-
tas rule so that by 1915, English law had recognized the right to
recover damages for nervous shock without physical injury.12 How-
ever, in Wilkinson v. Downton, 13 a case decided before the turn of
the century, damages for mental suffering were held allowable when
the defendant, as a practical joke, falsely represented to the plaintiff
that her husband had been in a serious accident in which both of his
legs were broken. The court upheld a jury award for mental suffer-
ing of the plaintiff caused by these statements. The court distin-
guished this case from Coultas on the basis that the defendant's
statements were calculated to be misleading and the damages suf-
fered were predictable and not too remote from the act complained
of.14
The United States was much slower than England in recogniz-
ing the right to "tranquility of the mind."' 5 In the same year that
Coultas was decided in England, the Supreme Court of New York
held in Lehman v. Brooklyn City Railroad 6 that a plaintiff could not
recover damages for physical injuries caused by nervous shock as
the result of being frightened by the defendant's runaway horse. Al-
though many jurisdictions repudiated the rule of nonliability for
mental suffering,' 7 Lehman and its progeny'" became the leading
11. Id. at 225.
12. Throckmorton, Damages/or Fright, 34 HARV. L. REV. 260, 263 (1920). In the case
of Coyle v. Watson, [1915] A.C. 1, the court expressed the evolution of the law on the issue:
But in England, in Scotland, and in Ireland alike, the authority of Victorian Rail-
ways Commissioners v. Coultas has been questioned, and, to speak quite frankly,
has been denied. I am humbly of opinion that the case can no longer be treated as
a decision of guiding authority. . . . I should add that other cases were cited
showing it to be fully established by authority-recent and strong authority-that
physical impact or lesion is not a necessary element in the case of recovery of
damage in ordinary cases of tort.
[1915] A.C. at 13-14.
13. [1897] 2 Q.B.D. 57.
14. Id. at 59-60. See also Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40, 42 (1956),
where Prosser states that the Wilkinson case is actually the first case to recognize the inflic-
tion of emotional distress as a cause of action.
15. Throckmorton, supra note 12, at 263.
16. 47 Hun. 355 (N.Y. 1888).
17. See Throckmorton, supra note 12, at 265 n.28 stating that, by 1920, seventeen juris-
dictions had adopted the rule of recovery in allowing damages for nervous shock without
actual impact.
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cases on this subject in America. Consequently, the rule of law was
established in many jurisdictions that recovery of damages for ner-
vous shock was not allowable without physical impact.' 9
An exception to the rule of nonliability developed in cases in
which the defendant's conduct was intentional or reckless.2 ° Hence,
another rule developed in American law arising from the case of
Wilkinson v. Downton,2' which allowed an award of damages for
mental distress on the basis of the defendant's outrageous and inten-
tional conduct, but only if the defendant's conduct involved an in-
dependent tortious act upon which one could append an award for
mental distress. 22 Around 1930, many jurisdictions dropped the re-
quirement that an award for mental distress had to be predicated
upon an independent cause of action and recognized the intentional
infliction of mental distress as a distinct cause of action.23
Arkansas was reluctant to accept the "new" tort, or, as it was
sometimes called, the "tort with no name. 24 As early as 1878, Chief
Justice English, speaking for the Arkansas Supreme Court, stated:
"[T]he ground of recovery must be something beside an injury to the
feelings and affections. . . there must be a loss to the claimant that
is capable of being measured by a pecuniary standard. ' 25 Damages
for mental anguish were not allowed in Peay v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co. ,26 in which late delivery of a telegram caused the plaintiff
to miss the funeral of a close relative. The Arkansas Supreme Court
fecognized the rule in Coultas and held that there was no right of
18. Spade v. Lynn & Boston Ry., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Mitchell v. Roches-
ter Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 147 Pa.
40, 23 A. 340 (1892).
19. See Throckmorton, supra note 12, at 264 n.25.
20. in Spade v. Lynn & Boston Ry., 168 Mass. 285,47 N.E. 88 (1897) the court seemed
to take this viewpoint for granted:
It is hardly necessary to add that his decision does not reach those classes of actions
where an intention to cause mental distress or to hurt the feelings is shown, or is
reasonably to be inferred, as, for example in cases of seduction, slander, malicious
prosecution, or arrest, and some others. Nor do we include cases of acts done with
gross carelessness or recklessness, showing utter indifference to such consequences,
when they must have been in the actor's mind.
Id. at 288, 47 N.E. at 89.
21. [1897] 2 Q.B.D. 857.
22. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40, 42-43 (1956).
23. Prosser, Intentional Infliction ofMental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV.
874 (1939).
24. Id. at 874-75.
25. Little Rock & Fort Smith Ry. v. Barker, 33 Ark. 350, 359-60 (1878).
26. 64 Ark. 538, 43 S.W. 965 (1898).
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recovery for mental pain unaccompanied by physical injury.2 7 In St.
Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway v. Bragg28 the court disal-
lowed any recovery of damages for fright when the plaintiff, with
her two children, was put off of the defendant's train on a dark night
and told by the brakeman that she would need to cross a cattle
crossing to get to the train depot. The Arkansas Supreme Court
held that she could not recover damages for fright, even though she
may have suffered physical injuries resulting from fright.29 The rule
in Bragg and Peay was carried one step further in the case of St.
Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway v. Taylor 30 in which the
Arkansas Supreme Court stated that damages for the infliction of
mental suffering cannot be made the subject of an independent ac-
tion even when the act complained of was intentional.31
It was not until 1920 that the rule of nonliability was relaxed to
a certain degree. In Rogers v. Williard32 the defendant unlawfully
entered the plaintiff's premises and threatened to shoot the plain-
tiff's husband. The plaintiff was pregnant at the time and the de-
fendant's actions caused her to have a miscarriage. The Arkansas
Supreme Court held that damages for fright were recoverable when
the fright was the result of a willful wrong, and the mental distur-
bance caused some type of bodily injury.33 In Stevenson v. John J
Grier Hotel Co. 31 the court ruled that mental distress was a proper
element of damages when a hotel manager wrongfully ejected the
plaintiff from the hotel and, in the presence of several people, falsely
accused her of adultery. The court did not depart from the rule re-
quiring a physical injury in order to recover damages for mental
27. Id. at 545-47, 43 S.W. at 966-67.
28. 69 Ark. 402, 64 S.W. 226 (1901).
29. Id. at 405-06, 64 S.W. at 277. See also Hines v. Witherspoon, 143 Ark. 131, 219
S.W. 1014 (1920); Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v. Mizell, 118 Ark. 153, 175 S.W. 396 (1915). In
Mizell, the rule was again stated that there is no recovery for mental anguish without an
accompanying physical injury. The court emphasized that there must be a connection be-
tween the physical injury suffered and the mental anguish. Id. at 155, 175 S.W. at 396-97.
30. 84 Ark. 42, 104 S.W. 551 (1907).
31. Id. at 48-49, 104 S.W. at 553. The rule in Taylor was subsequently reaffirmed in the
cases of Pierce v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry., 94 Ark. 489, 127 S.W. 707 (1910), and
Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v. Moss, 89 Ark. 187, 116 S.W. 192 (1909). Cf. Chicago, R. I. &
Pac. Ry. v. Allison, 120 Ark. 54, 178 S.W. 401 (1915) (The court allowd the plaintiff, a
white person, to recover damages for mental anguish when she was forced to ride in the
negro coach of a train, holding that she had a statutory right to ride in the white coach, and
therefore, the defendant had breached the contract of carriage. Accordingly, it was proper
for the jury to consider any humiliation suffered in measuring damages.)
32. 144 Ark. 587, 223 S.W. 15 (1920).
33. Id. at 592-93, 223 S.W. at 17.
34. 159 Ark. 44, 251 S.W. 355 (1923).
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distress, but rather found a constructive physical injury resulting
from the hotel manager's restraint and coercion of the plaintiff.35
The court broke new ground in Lyons v. Smith36 and brought
Arkansas in line with those jurisdictions allowing damages for
mental suffering absent physical injury when accompanied by an
independent, actionable tort.37  In Lyons the defendant had tres-
passed upon the plaintiff's property and, by using threats and intim-
idations, had prevented an employee from plowing the lands. The
defendant contended on appeal that a jury instruction which al-
lowed consideration of damages for mental suffering was erroneous
since there was no evidence of any physical injury.38 The Arkansas
Supreme Court disagreed, stating that mental suffering can serve as
an element of damages for another tortious wrong. 39 Finally, in Er-
win v. Milligan' the court held that damages were recoverable for
mental anguish when the defendant made indecent proposals to the
plaintiff. Citing Rogers v. Wi/iard4 ' the court held that when the
action is based on the intentional wrongful conduct of the defend-
ant, damages for mental anguish are recoverable without physical
injury.42 Although a technical battery could be found from the facts
in Erwin, the court made no reference to any independent tortious
wrong in order to provide a basis for recovery.43
35. Id. at 46-47, 251 S.W. at 356. The court cited Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v. Moss, 89
Ark. 187, 116 S.W. 192 (1909), in which the Arkansas Supreme Court first stated that the
physical injury need not be actual but may be constructive. See also Arkansas Motor
Coaches, Ltd. v. Whitlock, 199 Ark. 820, 136 S.W.2d 184 (1940).
36. 176 Ark. 728, 3 S.W.2d 982 (1928).
37. See Prosser, supra note 22, at 42-43.
38. Lyons v. Smith, 176 Ark. 728, 729-30, 3 S.W.2d 982, 983 (1928).
39. Id. at 730, 3 S.W.2d at 983. It is interesting to note that although Lyons introduced
a new rule of law with respect to damages for mental suffering, no authority was cited. The
decision seems to be based on public policy considerations, rather than any established rule
of law. The rule of Lyons was reiterated in Wilson v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 25 S.W.2d 428
(1930), in which the court held that recovery for mental suffering was allowable when it
formed an element of damages for an actionable tortious wrong; in this case, the plaintiff's
right to personal security. Wilson involved a situation in which five men went to the plain-
tiff's home late one night, accused him of stealing hogs, and told him to be out of town
within ten days or they would hang him.
40. 188 Ark. 658, 67 S.W.2d 592 (1934).
41. 144 Ark. 587, 223 S.W. 15 (1920).
42. Erwin v. Milligan, 188 Ark. 658, 663, 67 S.W.2d 592, 594 (1934). The opinion does
not mention Davis v. Richardson, 76 Ark. 348, 89 S.W. 318 (1905), in which the court held
that indecent proposals cannot serve as the basis for recovery of damages for mental anguish
when unaccompanied by physical injuries.
43. See Prosser, supra note 22, at 46-47. This rule was contrary to the general rule
about which Judge Magruder remarked: "[Tlhere is no harm in asking." Magruder, Mental
and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REv. 1033, 1055 (1936).
[Vol. 4:343
NOTES
The court took a new perspective of negligence actions in 0/an
Mills, Inc. v. Dodd.44 In that case, the court sustained an award of
$2500 for the mental anguish, humiliation and embarrassment suf-
fered by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's using the plain-
tiff's photograph on a post card for advertising purposes. Although
damages were awarded primarily for the mental anguish suffered,
the court based plaintiff's right to recover on another tortious
wrong: the invasion of privacy.45
In M.B.M. Co. v. Counce 6 the Arkansas Supreme Court aban-
doned the idea that a physical injury (either actual or constructive)
or an independent tortious act is necessary to justify a recovery for
damages relating to mental suffering. The court recognized the in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort for
which damages are recoverable. 47  Relying heavily upon the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,48 the court adopted the position
that the defendant's conduct must be extreme and outrageous to
warrant an award for emotional distress.49 It is not enough that the
defendant has acted with an intent to commit a tortious wrong. His
conduct must "go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized soci-
ety."' 50 Also, the emotional distress suffered must be so severe that a
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities could not endure it.5'
Furthermore, the defendant must either willfully or wantonly cause
the mental suffering.52 Affirming the court of appeals, the Arkansas
Supreme Court stated that there was a material issue of fact con-
44. 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22 (1962).
45. Id. at 499, 353 S.W.2d at 24. In Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F.
Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark. 1959), Chief Judge Henley made the statement that Arkansas was an
"impact state," requiring a physical injury before one could recover damages for negligently
inflicted mental distress. However, with 0/an Mills, this rule may have been abrogated.
Although a physical factor was involved in 0/an Mills, ie., loss of weight and sleeplessness,
the court made no mention of either of these factors to justify recovery.
46. 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980).
47. Id. at 279-80, 596 S.W.2d at 687-88.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) states:
Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress (1) One who by extreme
and outrageous eonduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to
the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
49. M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 280, 596 S.W.2d 681, 687-88 (1980).
50. Id. at 280, 596 S.W.2d at 687. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46,
Comment d (1965).
51. M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 280, 596 S.W.2d 681, 687 (1980). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment j (1965).
52. M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 280, 596 S.W.2d 681, 687 (1980).
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cerning whether defendant's conduct in refusing to pay plaintiff un-
til she took a polygraph test and in subsequently deducting thirty-
three dollars from her check after she passed the test constituted
extreme and outrageous conduct designed to cause severe emotional
distress. 3
The impact of M.B.M. Co. v. Counce on the substantive law in
Arkansas remains to be seen. Earlier Arkansas decisions, although
never actually recognizing the intentional infliction of emotional
distress as an independent tort, have strained to find a "physical in-
jury" or "actionable tortious wrong" in order to justify an award for
mental suffering.14
In Young v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc.," a decision which was
rendered about one month after A.B.M. Co., Judge Henry Woods,
without reference to M.B.M Co., noted that Arkansas was "in the
forefront of those states permitting recovery for insult and outrage,
the so-called 'tort without a name.' -56 The court cited Wilson v.
Wilkins,57 stating that the Arkansas Supreme Court had affirmed a
recovery of damages when there was "no allegation of any pain be-
yond mental anguish and humiliation. ' 58 The court also noted that
in Erwin v. Milligan," Arkansas recognized that inviting an unwill-
ing woman to commit illicit intercourse was an actionable tort.6 ° In
both cases, however, other tortious wrongs were involved: infringe-
ment of the right to personal security and a technical battery.6' It
could be inferred that no action for mental suffering would lie in
either of these cases without the presence of another tortious
wrong.62 In light of these conflicting interpretations, MB.M Co. is
53. The court considered the inconsistent statements of Jerrell Moss, the area supervi-
sor, to the Employment Security Division concerning the plaintiff's unsatisfactory conduct
to be a significant factor. Id. at 281, 596 S.W.2d at 688.
54. For example, in Wilson v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 25 S.W.2d 428 (1930), the court
based the right to recover mental damages on an infringement of the plaintiff's right to
personal security. Also, in Stevenson v. John J. Grier Hotel Co., 159 Ark. 44, 251 S.W. 355
(1923), the court strained the doctrine of "constructive physical injury" in finding that re-
straint and coercion provided a basis for recovery.
55. 487 F. Supp. 1184 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
56. Id. at 1186.
57. 181 Ark. 137, 25 S.W.2d 428 (1930). This case is discussed at note 39 supra.
58. Young v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
59. 188 Ark. 658, 67 S.W.2d 592 (1934).
60. Young v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
61. See Prosser, supra note 22, at 42.
62. Justice Fogleman raises this point in M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. at 279, 596
S.W.2d at 687.
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significant because it makes clear an area of the law that has been in
disarray and confusion from its inception.
The court in MB.M Co. was not presented with the question
of whether negligence can provide an action for the infliction of
emotional distress. In future cases the court may narrowly construe
the MB.M. Co. decision since it declares that the defendant's con-
duct must be "wilful or wanton"63 to be actionable. Therefore, the
Arkansas decisions previously discussed may still be valuable prece-
dent when a defendant, by his negligent conduct, causes mental dis-
tress." If so, the plaintiff will be required to show some type of
physical injury65 or an independent tortious act.66
Regardless of the court's narrow holding in M.B.M. Co., it has
provided this jurisdiction with a distinct, actionable tort. At the
very least, it has given the so-called "tort with no name" a title.
John P. Lewis
63. M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. at 280, 596 S.W.2d at 688 (1980).
64. See generaly W. PROSSER, TORTS § 54, at 327 (4th ed. 1971).
65. See Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688, 697 (E.D. Ark. 1959),
and cases cited therein.
66. Olan Mills, Inc. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22 (1962).
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